











Primljeno: 9. 11. 1999.
This paper deals with the change of the ethnic structure of Petri-
nja and its causes that seem to be paradigmatic for ethnically
mixed areas in Croatia. Petrinja was chosen due to its bipolar
ethnic structure in which the Croats and Serbs constitute the gre-
ater part of the population but also owing to the fact that radical
changes in the proportion of these groups took place in the1945-
-1998 period. As late as 1948 Croats constituted slight-ly more
than four fifths of the city population. In the year 1991 there were
40.96% of Croats, 45.14% of Serbs and 13.9% of "other and un-
known" in the city of Petrinja. Thus in the city of Pe-trinja in four
decades, the Croats lost their status of explicit majo-rity with a
tendency of decreasing in percentage. The causes of these pro-
cesses are to be found in the formation of new mobili-sational
channels (negative selection of personnel, "nomen-clature" etc.)
typical for the post-war communist regime. The power was based
on the charisma of the local partisans and the members of the
Communist Party in the political system with which (it seems) the
local Serbs identified more than did the Croats. The scheme
characterised by links between ideology and subethnic traditions
(patriarchal modes, paternalism, ethnocen-trism), family net-
works, the inclination of the undeveloped wider periphery (with
Serbian majority) towards Petrinja resulted in se-lective migration
and, consequently, in the changes in the ethnic structure. Drama-
tic changes in the ethnic structure took place in 1991 with the ag-
gression against Croatia. The migration flows have not stabilised
yet. Not until the next census (in 2001) the consequences on the
ethnic structure of Petrinja left by the war and post-war hap-
penings will be clearly shown.
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A mere change can be of the kind observable in clouds or
smoke rings: now they look like this, now like that. A concept
of social change that does not distinguish clearly between
changes that relate to the structure of a society and those that
do not – and, further, between structural changes without a
specific direction and those which follow a particular direc-
tion over many generations, e. g., toward greater or lesser
complexity – is a very inadequate tool of sociological inquiry.
(Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process)
Between the claim that "one cannot step into the same river
twice" to the claim that "there is nothing newunder the sun" so-
ciological theory has woven a series of explanations of social
changes and social structures.* These mutually complemen-
tary concepts indicate two traits of social life, on the one hand
its mutability, and on the other its constancy, continuity. Name-
ly, to identify social changes means to perceive changes in so-
cial structure. Numerous factors (which Giddens condensed
into three groups: the environment, political organisation and
cultural factors) influence social change most often in mutual
interaction and often can only be studied and explained in
such a framework (Giddens, 1990). War, new forms of admin-
istration and/or new ruling ideologies can influence social
change. We shall attempt to relate precisely these processes
and mechanisms with changes in the ethnic structure (of Pet-
rinja) so as to explain the causes of the process. Likewise, our
goal is to identify the traits of social changes that during the
past decades, as shown by the relevant data, have brought
about pronounced ethnically characterised mobility.
Petrinja, in the region of Banovina,1 has been selected due
to a bipolar structure in which Croats and Serbs make up the
great majority of the population, and also because of the fact
that from 1945 to 1998 it has been the place of radical changes
in the proportions of these ethnic groups the causes of which
seem paradigmatic for the nationally mixed areas in Croatia.
It is precisely the bipolar ethnic structure that implies an al-
most natural competitiveness between the two peoples who
have during the long centuries shared the same space, but
have not always had the same access to resources of power.
The ethnic boundary between them (in Barth's sense) has al-
ways existed and is visible right from the use of ethnonyms
that summarise ethnic traits and sometimes also the relation-
ship between ethnic groups.2 The differentiation between "us"
and "them" is also aided by the spatial dispersion into ethni-
cally mainly homogenous villages gravitating to Petrinja, as the







* This paper was








Petrinja is the centre of a municipality of the same namewhich
according to the former territorial organisation (in use until the
census of 1991) covered an area of 390 km2 with 57 settlements.
The census data from 1857 until 1991 show an unequal
development of the number of inhabitants of the town of
Petrinja and of the same-named municipality (Table 1).255
 FIGURE 1
Village (rural) settle-












(Census) Municipality (town) settlements
1857 18 841 3 222 15 619
1880 21 514 4 478 17 036
1900 28 422 5 379 23 063
1921 28 963 5 541 23 422
1948 24 819 5 221 19 598
1961 27 977 8 065 19 912
1971 31 018 12 155 18 863
1981 33 570 15 778 17 792
1991 35 565 18 706 16 859
* According to the territorial administrative delimitation in 1991.
Source: For the period 1857-1971 Koren~i}, 1979; for 1981
Dokumentacija 553, Republi~ki zavod za statistiku, Zagreb, 1984;
for 1991Dokumentacija 882,Dr`avni zavod za statistiku, Zagreb, 1994.
In thirteen decades the number of inhabitants of the mu-
nicipality ofPetrinjahasnot yetdoubled (with an indexof change
of 188.8). A comparison with the total population of Croatia
(where the corresponding index is 218.2) shows that the re-
gion in question fell behind in its population dynamics.
It is interesting to compare the town and the group of the
other settlements (all of which, with one exception, constitute
small villages). Until 1948 both Petrinja and surrounding rural
area had a similar trend of population development: growth
– stagnation – reduction. The fall in the number of inhabitants
was connected to the demographic losses in the Second World
War.
After the Second World War there were important social
changes and an acceleration of relevant processes. The post-
war concept of general and regional development was based
on the assumption that socialist society must become an in-
dustrialised society, and that collectivism and social economy
should dominate in agriculture. Proceeding from this approach,
the total accelerated post-war development was conducted in
the sense of forced urban-based industrialisation (of the oli-
gocentric type). This brought about a shift in spatial popula-
tion gravitation and great changes in regional development.
Larger cities became focal points in complex regional devel-
opment and population polarities, whereas at the same time
smaller urban centres in rural areas did not develop to a cor-
responding degree. The post-war decades were characterised
by a dual society and a dual economy, in which the peasantry
was an unequal and backward segment. In such circumstan-
ces Croatia experiences a strong deruralisation and spatial re-
distribution of population. The effects of this were, among o-
ther things, a quicker growth of urban population and exten-256
 TABLE 1
Number of inhabitants
of the municipality of
Petrinja, the town of
Petrinja and other
settlements in 1857-
1991 (in the indicated
census years)*
sive depopulation of village (i.e. rural) settlements (out of a
total of 5,800 rural settlements, as many as 88.4% had less in-
habitants in 1981 than in 1953; Neja{mi}, 1991: 157).
The region of Petrinja was not exempt from these proces-
ses. Village (rural) settlements had a continuous fall in popu-
lation (index 1991/1948 = 86.0), while at the same time the town
of Petrinja itself had a strong increase (index 358.3), especially
during the period 1961-1971 (index 150.7). Comparison with
the group including all the municipality centres in Croatia
shows that this growth in population was above average. The
index of population change for 1948-1971 was 232.8 for Petri-
nja and 188.1 for the entire group of municipality centres (Fri-
ganovi}, 1980: 84). The result of such a divergent demogra-
phic development was also a greater percentage of the Petri-
nja town population in the total population of the municipal-
ity: 17.1% in 1857, 18.9% in 1900, 21.0% in 1948 and 52.6% in 1991.
An even clearer picture of the demographic development is
given by the fact that out of a total of 57 settlements in the
municipality as many as 51 had less inhabitants in 1991 than
in 1948.
The dynamics that we have shown in regard to the nu-
merical development of the population indicate differential
migration in the area observed. Petrinja and some of the sur-
rounding settlements attracted immigrants, whereas the rural
area was mainly characterised by emigration, or better said by
exodus. This is confirmed by data on the net migration bal-
ance between 1961 and 1981, which was a period when the
population of the town almost doubled.
Natural growth Population 1981 Net Migration balance
1961-1981 expected* census data 1961-1981
Petrinja 2 240 10 305 15 778 + 5 473
Other settlements 348 20 260 17 792 - 2 468
* Expected on the basis of the population in 1961 and natural growth during 1961-1981
Source: For the population data the same as in Table 1; for natural growth according to Tablo-
grami o ro|enima i umrlima po naseljima (Odjel statistike stanovni{tva), Dr`avni zavod za statis-
tiku, Zagreb.
The data shows that the total population growth in Petri-
nja during 1961-1981 (7,713 persons according to Table 1) is
71.0% the result of immigration and 29.0% the result of nat-
ural growth. On the other hand, the group of other settle-
ments has had a pronounced negative migration balance;
2,468 more persons have emigrated than have immigrated (this
accounts for 13.1% of the average population of the "other














In conclusion it can be said that divergent demographic
dynamics have been one of the basic population-settlement
characteristics in the observed area. Petrinja itself became an
ever more factor in accounting for the biological and socio-
economic reproduction of the entire area, while the rural part
of the municipality continued to depopulate and to struc-
turally erode.
Thewar in Croatia (1991-1995) and the after-war phase pro-
voked dramatic changes in the demographic, and especially
in the ethnic structure of the observed area. The town of Pe-
trinja and dozens of settlements with a Croat majority popu-
lation fell into the hands of the rebelled Serbs. The vast major-
ity of the Croats (and a smaller number of Serbs) became re-
fugees, 112 civilians were killed and 9 would be registered as
missing. In 1995, during and after the operation "Storm" con-
ducted by the Croatian armed forces, the great majority of the
Serbs left Croatia in an organised mode (about 500 remained
on the territory of the municipality), while a part perished du-
ring the military action and after it (according to the estimates
a few dozen). In this way Petrinja and the surrounding vil-
lages became a practically empty territory.
Very soon after the re-establishment of Croatian state ad-
ministration wide-scale renovation began. Croat displaced
persons gradually returned, Croat refugees from Bosnia ar-
rived and settled in the region, and the return of Serbs also
began. How many inhabitants does the area in question now
have? We have at our disposal data on the size and structur-
al traits of the population in 1998 – they relate to the formermu-
nicipality of Petrinja, but according to the new territorial or-
ganisation (Table 3).
1998 1991 Index 1998/91
Petrinja (urban area of the town) 15 324 18 706 81.9
Settlements on the territory of the Petrinja Town* 5 734 10 364 55.3
Jabukovac municipality* 1 218 6 495 18.8
Total 22 276 35 565 62.6
* According to the new territorial organisation (from the beginning of 1993) the area of the for-
mer municipality was divided between two territorial administrative units: Petrinja Town, con-
stituted by the urban settlement of Petrinja and 32 separate settlements and the municipality
of Jabukovac, including 24 settlements.
Source: Socijalna slika Grada Petrinje, Sisa~ko-moslava~ka `upanija, Grad Petrinja, Upravni od-
jel za dru{tvene djelatnosti, Petrinja, 1998.
On the territory of the former municipality of Petrinja (to-
day the territory of Petrinja Town and the municipality of Jabu-
kovac) in June 1998 there were 22,276 inhabitants, 37.4% less














fore the aggression against Croatia). Petrinja, as the central settle-
ment, suffered the least loss in relation to 1991 (18.1%). This
was also expected, since a large part of the returnees was set-
tled in the town itself while expecting the renovation of their
houses in the surrounding villages, and most of the Croat re-
fugees from Bosnia were also situated in Petrinja. One and the
other group together number about 3,500 persons.
The rural area, however, is being renovated significantly
more slowly. Settlements on the territory of Petrinja Town (in
which Croats were the majority population in 1991) have in
total 5,734 inhabitants, which is only a bit over half of their
population in 1991. Among these settlements, Mo{}enica (a sub-
urb of Petrinja) accounts for 3,211 inhabitants. This means
that in all the other settlements together (numbering a total of
31) there are 2,523 inhabitants or in average 81, and this is
only a third of the pre-war number (7,533 people lived in
them in 1991). The least number of people live in the munici-
pality of Jabukovac (which includes 24 settlements in which
Serbs were formerly the majority population). It now has 1,218
inhabitants, or 19% of the pre-war number – on average 51
inhabitants per settlement.
ETHNIC COMPOSITION
According to the census (1991) the population of the town and
municipality of Petrinja had a simple ethnic structure – 9/10
were Croats and Serbs, whereas among the other ethnic groups
over a half were persons who had declared themselves as "Yu-
goslavs" (Table 4).







Others and undeclared 3.03 4.26
Unknown 1.08 1.29
Total 100.00 100.00
* Ethnic groups with over 0.1% are mentioned individually.
Source:Dokumentacija 881, Republi~ki zavod za statistiku, Zagreb, 1992.
In retro perspective we may reduce the number of ethnic
groups. We are interested, first of all, in the changes in the per-
centages of Croats and Serbs in the total population of the mu-
nicipality (in relation to the territorial division of 1991) and the










the town of Petrinja in
1991 (%)
Municipality (total) Petrinja (town)
Year Croats Serbs Croats Serbs
1900 55.3 42.3 79.9 13.0
1910 53.4 43.9 80.4 12.2
1948 58.4 40.6 82.3 14.0
1953 57.3 41.0 77.5 16.4
1961 55.0 42.7 67.6 26.8
1971 52.9 43.5 55.8 37.3
1981 43.6 37.6 39.3 31.4
1991 44.4 44.9 41.0 45.1
Source: Narodnosni i vjerski sastav stanovni{tva Hrvatske 1880-1991. po
naseljima, Dr`avni zavod za statistiku, Zagreb, 1998.
The data given clearly shows the reduction in the pro-
portion of Croats and the growth of the proportion of Serbs
in the population of the municipality and the town. At the be-
ginning of the 20th century Croats constituted the majority in
the population of the municipality. In Petrinja itself the pro-
portion of the two ethnic groups was even more expressively
to the advantage of Croats – here they constituted 4/5 of the
population.
The data from the first post-WWII census (1948) shows
that the war and the events following immediately afterwards
caused not only a population reduction (see Table 1), but also
certain changes in the proportions of the individual ethnic
groups in Petrinja municipality. Since we do not know the
ethnic composition of the population during the inter-war pe-
riod (the 1921 and 1931 census), we can only compare the da-
ta from 1910 (although it must be used with certain reserve).
At any rate, during the period in question, the greatest differ-
ence in the proportions of Serbs and Croats on the territory of
the municipality was registered in 1948: Croats 58.4%, Serbs
40.6%. There were various reasons for this effect. First, the Ser-
bian population suffered relatively greater losses during World
War II.3 Second, a relatively higher percentage of Serbs in the
partisan units effected demographic changes also after the war.
Namely, many peasants-partisan fighters remained in the ar-
my and police force, or were "recruited" into positions of au-
thority in the economy and administration, thus permanent-
ly leaving their home regions. Furthermore, partisans and their
families were given preference in the allocation of land and
those also from the Petrinja region participated to a relatively
higher proportion in planned migration ("colonisation" between
1945 and 1948) to Slavonia and Vojvodina (Maticka, 1990).
It should be stated, therefore, that at the beginning of the
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lation in the municipality and a marked majority in Petrinja
itself (as we have seen, over 4/5). Later census data showed a
continuous and significant fall in the proportion of Croats in
the population of the municipality (the 1991/1948 index of
change amounted to 76.0), and a significant growth of the
proportion of Serbs (an index of 110.6). Such divergent devel-
opment brought about a practically equal proportion of Cro-
ats and Serbs in the municipality by 1991: 44.4% Croats, 44.9%
Serbs and 10.7% "others and unknown". The data shows an
unusual reduction of the proportions of Croats and Serbs in
1981. It should be said that in the interim period there was no
large immigration of members of other ethnic groups, but
simply persons of Croat or Serb origin declared themselves as
"Yugoslavs" (5,159 or 15.4% of the total population; in 1971
there were 567 and in 1991 1,814 such persons). The number of
members of this group doubtlessly was dependent on politi-
cal conditions.
In the same period there were two other marked changes
in the settlement of Petrinja itself. The proportion of Croats
was cut in half (the 1991/1948 index of change was 49.8), whe-
reas the proportion of Serbs tripled (an index of 322.1). In this
way during four decades Croats changed from being a pro-
nouncedmajority people to being aminority (in 1991 there were
41.0% Croats, 45.1% Serbs and 13.9% "others and unknown")4
(see Figure 2).
We might take a look at some indicators of this post-WWII
reversal. Comparison of the data from the 1948 census and
the 1991 census (Table 6) shows that the number of Croats in
the municipality increased only slightly (an index of 109.0)
while at the same time there was a significant growth of the
number of Serbs (158.5). In Petrinja itself, in which population
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of Croats was registered (an index of 178.3), while the num-
ber of Serbs increased ten-fold (an index of 1,153.7). It should
be said that in the rural environment, which was otherwise
characterised by strong depopulation, the reduction in the
number of Croats (an index of 79.7) and Serbs (80.5) was prac-
tically equal. The data presented shows that the reason for the
observed change should be sought primarily in population mi-
gration, selective by ethnic affiliation.
Municipality (total) Petrinja (town) Other settlements
1948 1991 1948 1991 1948 1991
Croats 14 491 15 790 4 298 7 662 10 193 8 128
Serbs 10 075 15 969 732 8 445 9 343 7 524
Others* and unknown 253 3 806 191 2 599 62 1 207
Total 24 819 35 565 5 221 18 706 19 598 16 859
* "Yugoslavs" constitute about a half. Source: Same as Table 5.
As well as changing the general demographic picture, the
1991-1995 war also changed the ethnic picture of Petrinja. Al-
ready at the beginning of the war, when Petrinja and the sur-
rounding area was under Serb control, thorough "ethnic clean-
sing" of the non-Serbian population was carried out.5 During
the military-police action of the Croatian forces, as mentioned
above, an exodus of the Serbs occurred. After the return of Pe-
trinja into the system of Croatian state authority the area was
demographically revived. What is the most recent ethnic struc-
ture of the population? We can imagine it on the basis of avail-
able official data (for 1998) for individual population contin-
gents:
a) returnees, almost all Croats, 13,568;
b) immigrants (refugees from Bosnia), also almost all
Croats, 2,526;
c) returnees from the Croatian Danubian region and from
Yugoslavia, mostly Serbs, 1,244;
d) inhabitants of villages on the territory of Petrinja Town
who were not occupied during the war, mostly Croats,
4,938;
in total 22,276 people (same source as in Table 3).
With the help of the indicated data and other material
acquired in the field we might formulate" the probable ethnic
structure of the former municipality of Petrinja in mid-1998
(today for the territory of Petrinja Town and the municipality
of Jabukovac): 86.5% Croats, 9.5% Serbs, 4% others and un-
known. The ethnic structure for Petrinja itself would be as fol-
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in the group of other
settlements in 1948
and 1991
THE CAUSES FOR CHANGES
IN THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION
In fact we are looking for an answer to the question: what is
the reason for the divergent development of the proportions
of Croats and Serbs in the case of Petrinja during the period
1948-1991? It should be noted that something similar did not
occur in the neighbouringmunicipalities with amixed, but pre-
dominantly Serb population: Dvor, Glina, Kostajnica, Vojni}
and Vrginmost (cf. Klemen~i} and Ore{i}, 1991). We have seen
that the number of inhabitants of Petrinja in the period 1948-
1991 increased 3.5 times (Table 1), mainly due to immigration.
To provide a complete explanation for this development
it is necessary to examine the data on natural growth. Ave-
rage natural population growth in the municipality of Petri-
nja was 4.3‰ (1948-1991). We do not have data on natural
growth according to ethnic affiliation, but we can with cer-
tainty assume that it was somewhat greater among Serbs than
among Croats. Namely, relatively more Croats than Serbs lived
in the town. Besides this, the differential rate was effected
also by a strong immigration flow of Serbs from North-West
Bosnia, a region characterised by "a higher norm" of the birth
rate. It is estimated that the average yearly increment among
Croats was about 4‰ and among Serbs about 4.7‰.
From this it can be deduced that according to natural growth
in 1991 themunicipality of Petrinja shouldhavehad 16,954Croats,
i.e. 17% or 2,463 more than in 1948, although the actual in-
crease was 1,299 (9.0%). Taking into account the fact that some
of the Croats declared themselves as "Yugoslavs" (knowing the
circumstances prior to the 1991 census we could say that there
were relatively few persons of "Croat origin" among the 1,814
"Yugoslavs"), we could conclude that the Croat contingent was
more characterised by emigration, or more precisely by a neg-
ative migration balance. Among Serbs the situation was total-
ly reversed. According to natural growth in 1991 there should
have been 12,100 of them, i.e. 20% or 2,025 more than in 1948,
but the actual increment amounted to 5,894 (58.5%). Hence,
the strong growth of the number (and proportion) of Serbs in
the municipality was above all the result of immigration; the
positivemigration balance amounted to 3,869 persons (the num-
ber would also be significantly higher if we take into consid-
eration the fact that the contingent of "Yugoslavs" was to a large
degree most probably generated by persons of Serb origin).6
We may conclude that Croats emigrated (as did, understand-
ably, some Serbs), while Serbs immigrated, and provided,
doubtlessly, a strong majority in the immigrant contingent.
In accord with the general processes mentioned, the town
of Petrinja itself, being an important urban and industrial cen-263
tre, attracted the great majority of persons who immigrated
from other municipalities in Croatia and from the other re-
publics in the former state, and among these persons Serbs
constituted the great majority. It also attracted most of the
population that emigrated from other settlements in the same
municipality. The data given above (Table 6) shows that the
proportions of both Croats and Croats in rural settlements in
the municipality fell equally, but this does not mean that im-
migration into the municipal centre was relatively equal. The
town of Petrinja was more attractive to Serbs than to Croats
(the latterweremore frequently attracted to other centres inCro-
atia – Zagreb, Sisak, etc.). This accounts for the abrupt growth
of Petrinja itself and the change in the proportion of Croats
and Serbs in the town.
The question may be posed: Where did the immigrants
come from? Most came from other municipalities in Croatia
(4/5). Since theory says that the strength of migration is inver-
sely proportional to the distance between the departure and
arrival points, we can say that it is highly probable that most
of the immigrants came from neighbouring municipalities in
Banovina and in Kordun (this is also indicated by the fact that
these regions are areas of high depopulation). Among persons
who immigrated from other republics in the former state, the
majority came from Bosnia and Herzegovina (70%), mainly
from the border areas in the North-West, where municipali-
ties with Serb majorities are located (Bosanska Dubica, Bosan-
ski Novi, etc.).
What caused such ethnic selectivity in the migration flows?
What induced Serbs to immigrate and Croats to emigrate, and
why to such a degree? Although we are aware of the mesh of
numerous socio-economic factors (which as a rule derive from
unequal regional development), and we have also kept in mind
the spontaneity and other traits of migration (often develop-
ing via family and friendship channels), it is still difficult to
eliminate the impression that there was also the effect of a
"quite" planned migration (or colonisation).
Since the head-spinning changes in the ethnic composi-
tion of Petrinja began after the Second World War, it is neces-
sary to return to the past, at least to that time.7 Instrumental-
isation of the history of the war and post-war period hadmade
it difficult to use the available literature in an analysis of inter-
ethnic relations from that time. Nevertheless, it may be said
that despite the participation of both peoples in the Anti-fas-
cist resistance, among the Serbs selected (often generalised
and instrumentalised) memories of the "Croat sin" of the Us-
tasha had their effect on the organisation of post-war life in








of Croatia" (1941) the centre of the regional Ustasha authori-
ties was located in Petrinja (see Kora}, 1981; Golec, 1993). From
a regime allied with Nazi German and Fascist Italy many mis-
fortunes befell mainly the Serbs.8 At the same time, the Petri-
nja communists (to a high degree Croats) participated in or-
ganising the Anti-Fascist resistance as well as the First parti-
san unit in Croatia (as well as in all former Yugoslavia). How-
ever the circumstances, different for Serbs and Croats, had an
effect on the number of members of the two ethnic groups
who were to become involved in the partisan movement in
Banovina. A large number of Serbs in Banovina sought in the
Anti-Fascist mobilisation an escape from the suffering that
they faced from the Ustasha regime. This paved theway to their
identification with the Communist party.9 This primarily in-
fluenced the post-war tendency of reducing the role of Croats
in the partisan movement in Banovina, of distribution of po-
wer, and indirectly also the changes in the ethnic composi-
tion, which we are discussing.
Causes for the changes in the ethnic composition can be
divided into two basic groups. The first group involves sys-
tematic changes introduced by the new regime (industrialisa-
tion, urbanisation, newmobilisation channels). The secondwould
include inherited traits of patriarchal society and ethnocen-
trism, which gradually were transformer from latent and vei-
led supra-ethnic ideologies to manifest forms, finally produc-
ing ethnic mobilisation and conflict. Although it is difficult to
distinguish these two groups of factors, since they are inter-
twined, the causes of ethnic changes can to a certain degree
be shown also chronologically. An inevitably simplified chro-
nology of the causes would appear as follows (the first two
causes occur simultaneously):
1. The new regime – new ideologies – new mobility channels.
The centralised party state that had been "forged in war and
revolution" relatively quickly abandoned the idea of democ-
ratic society and political pluralism, basing its authority on a
"monism of intellect" which discarded all that was incompat-
ible with the Bolshevik revolutionary project, and not recog-
nising any individual initiative (Kri`an, 1991). The new re-
gime introduced also its own criteria for advancement along
the social ladder – among them the criterion of "political apt-
ness" (which brought about negative selection of personnel and
the phenomenon of "nomenclature"). The institution of "con-
nections and protection" became a mobilisation channel, which
was followed and used in as much as one's degree of power
permitted it; an entire system of domination and subordina-
tion was developed, which affirmed paternalistic relations with







tions a strong sub-institutional tradition was preserved, which
often acted against the institutional order, destroying it, with
its values and patterns of behaviour that derived from patri-
archal culture (Katunari}, 1982). Most workers "by their socio-
psychological traits belong to the old, peasant system of life.
Addressing one other as 'cousin' or 'countryman' often repre-
sents the highest level of social cohesion" (Kuva~i}, 1970: 193).
In such a newly established regime and in the system of val-
ues that it brought with it perhaps we could find elements
pertaining to the causes for the emigration of a part of the Cro-
ats from Petrinja. The Croat urban dwellers born in town, as
opposed to the newly arrived peasant, mainly Serb, popula-
tion, most probably had – at least to a degree – formulated a
system of values and industrial production: work, order, dis-
cipline, control, awareness of the value of knowledge and a
competitive spirit as well as personal initiative. Individuals
with such a formation are potentially more mobile. Besides
this, a feeling on the part of the domestic population that sta-
ble relations are threatened would also act as push factor.
2. Sub-ethnic traditions – ethnocentrism. The power organi-
sation of a state imbibed with Communist ideology was dup-
licated to the local level via the technique of "democratic cen-
tralism". Between the liberation (1945) and the seventies Com-
munist rule in Petrinja was based on the charisma of (Bano-
vina) partisans and members of the Communist party. Revo-
lutionary accomplishments, reduced mainly to the Banovina
Serbs were transformed into the local structures of authority
and the village-to-town migration flow. For this generation of
politicians (usually also directors of the economy, since posi-
tions of authority were rotated according to the principle of
the "social carrousel") it should be said that it is "heroic and
conquering", that it is governed by "self-sacrifice, a collective
spirit and faith in the future". It can be said that strong ties of
solidarity are maintained, on the one hand, by "well-preserved
primary groups, families, family networks, neighbourhoods
and village communes" (Katunari}, 1982: 364), and on the other
hand by homogenisation based on shared wartime experi-
ence. At the time of economic boom, renovation of the econ-
omy (industrialisation and often forced migration from the
villages to towns), and formation of the new society the patri-
archal and paternalistic style was carried over to personnel po-
licy. The basis of evaluating people was first of all formed by
blood, emotional and personal ties as well as estimation of
political and wartime merits, and only then by work capabil-
ities. "Local patriotism"10 and pressures to help family mem-
bers and friends often were the main criteria in receiving em-








ties multiplied had also a strong basis in ethnic solidarity.
Thus changes in the ethnic structure of the population were
also in a special type of correlation with the ethnic composi-
tion of persons of authority in Petrinja, among whom from
1945 onwards Serbs were over-represented.11
3. System changes – the power of local authorities. The ele-
mentary nature and spontaneity of this form of ethnic soli-
darity that had the power to change the ethnic picture of a
town12 found support also in some system decisions. Namely,
the Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists (ac-
cepted in 1958) was imagined as a platform for long-term so-
cial development and an intensified process of de-statism
that intended to give workers and work collectives the role of
bearers of social development (cf. Biland`i}, 1985). In this way
a good part of decision-making was transferred to the local
level. In such circumstances, a platform for long-term devel-
opment of Banovina was formulated during the sixties, which
formally gave Petrinja the role of being a gravitation centre
for the region (see Program razvoja Banije..., 1966). The popu-
lation of undeveloped municipalities naturally and logically
gravitates to developed regional centres. From this time it gra-
vitated to Petrinja also by plan. The authorities, in accord with
their preferences and understanding of conditions, decided
to tie the future of the town with its undeveloped hinterland
and not with a more developed centre (Zagreb). If we link this
to the fact that the population of the region oriented towards
Petrinja is predominantly Serb,13 to preferential treatment of
Serbs in receiving employment, in distribution of housing, of
building sites (some parts of Petrinja, new housing zones, were
almost ethnically totally Serb) and of loans (especially those
designated by the strange syntagm – "repayment-free loans"),
then we can understand why the mass immigration to the Pe-
trinja area of persons of Serb ethnic affiliation acquired sys-
tematic characteristics.14
4. Ideologisation – ethnic competition. The image of econo-
mic success with which the (as a whole former Yugoslav) soci-
ety entered the seventies totally changed at the end of this
decade. In such a way, the political crisis (conflicts within the
Federation) from the beginning of the decade was to be sealed
by the economic crisis. At the same time, new generations of
potentates came to the scene that could not evoke their par-
ticipation in the war and could not use their own charisma to
reproduce their power. The new ruling elite in Petrinja, due
to its incompetence, ignorance or inability to resolve in a pro-
ductive manner the economic, cultural and political crisis in
the municipality, took recourse to the use of repression and







which it reproduced its power were to be paternalism and
ethnocentrism. Polarisation of ethnicity was continued, and
the criterion for party aptness and ethnic affiliation that reg-
ulated access to resources took the form of a caricature.16 All
criticism of such behaviour was eliminated by imposing ide-
ology, and even persons that would possibly have dissonant
opinions were demonised. The search for the "enemy" pre-
vented control and criticism, while the label of being a "na-
tionalist" was a last-instance accusation: when there was no le-
gitimate way of dealing with an opponent he would be defi-
nitely marginalised by being labelled a "nationalist", which in
an ideologised society no one could easily remove from him-
self. The victim could only retire into the private sphere or
else leave. This process became more intense after the "Cro-
atian Spring" and continued until the first democratic elections
in 1990.17 The changes in the ethnic composition of the popu-
lation assumed at this time also the aspect of antagonising
ethnic groups. The black and white picture in supporting ma-
inly members of one people and demonising members of the
other was retouched by adding a layer of ideology (under
which violations of human rights could be well seen) and of
"Yugoslavism".18
5. Ethnic mobilisation – conflict. After the Communist party
lost the first multiparty elections in 1990 many Serb voters
perceived this as their own defeat. Formany of them thismeant
the loss of mobility channels to which they had been accus-
tomed, and therefore also the loss of political resources.19 The
nationalist rhetoric of the new Croatian authorities, and espe-
cially the "new Constitution and composition of the Parliament
made clear to Serbs in Croatia that – since they would deport
themselves as an electoral minority and no longer as a 'con-
stitutive people' – they would be essentially limited in their
political competivity. The old (political) resources, in otherwords,
were lost, and new ones, which would be of the same rank,
were mainly out of reach" ([tulhofer, 1993: 376). Systematic eth-
nic homogenisation that had began in Serbia with the Kosovo
crisis already in the mid-1980s, media propaganda which es-
pecially emphasized sufferings during the Second World War
and spread ethnic stereotypes or constructions such as the ste-
reotype of the "genocidal nature" of Croats, stimulated the dis-
content of Croatian Serbs. Orientation towards seeking help
from the Yugoslav National Army, the distribution of arms to
the Serb population (and disarming of the Croat population)
provoked an induced conflict. Croatian (and Petrinja) Serbswere
exploited (not for the first time) for the needs of Belgrade po-
litics. In this context, most Petrinja Serbs, in one way or anoth-








other occupied areas, ethnically "cleansed" the territory, which
they later – in 1995 – lost, and then left in a mass exodus.
Since themigration flows provoked by the recentwar events
have not yet stabilised, the ethnic composition of Petrinja will
still experience changes. An exact and detailed demographic
picture of the Petrinja region, especially of the effects of the
war and post-war events on the ethnic structure, shall be pos-
sible to construct only after the next population census (in 2001).
IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION
Petrinja is one of the ethnically mixed Croatian towns that has
significantly and finally dramatically changed its ethnic struc-
ture. Similar processes took place also in other peripheral or
semi-peripheral parts of Croatia. Especially illustrative are the
towns of the North Dalmatian hinterland (Benkovac, Drni{,
Knin, Obrovac) in which Croats were the majority in towns
themselves and Serbs were the majority in the surrounding
settlements (cf. Neja{mi}, 1992). Petrinja is different in that its
ethnic structure changed, although Croats were once the ma-
jority population both in the town and in themunicipality. How-
ever, this transformation was not only the result of a simple
redistribution within the framework of the municipality (from
the villages to the town) and the region. It was primarily the re-
sult of selective immigration in which Serbs, much more than
Croats, were stimulated by possibilities of easy and quick so-
cial promotion.
Despite several decades of an official ideology that spoke
of equal rights of peoples, forbade and through the educatio-
nal system suppressed ethnic prejudices20 "latent cultural trans-
mission generated impressions of an unequal position and un-
fair treatment of individual peoples" (Katunari}, 1991: 132). For
this reason political elites could usefully exploit ethnic groups
as a basis for mass mobilisation. It was shown that the dicho-
tomy of "us" and "them" survived through time and that in dif-
ferent political, economic and cultural conditions only the at-
tributes changed which members of the groups attributed to
one another (or to themselves). True, supra-ethnic ideologies
influenced the formation of a feeling of "Yugoslavism" among
some members of both ethnic groups. However, instability in
the number of persons declaring themselves as "Yugoslavs" in-
dicates that for many of them this was not a change of their
identification framework, but rather an inclination to conform
to the ruling ideology (see note 18). This example (i.e. the rise
and later fall of the number of "Yugoslavs") shows that ideol-
ogy in this case brought about only superficial "smoke ring"
changes. Although conformism can be a way in which the so-







ethnic identity shows itself as being a resistant intimate sphere
of human life that in constant interaction with its environ-
ment transforms its traits but maintains continuity of its sin-
gularity.
Changes of the ethnic structure, however, influenced in
multiple ways the economic and socio-cultural image of the
town. Life in a town with a baroque nucleus, amiable nature
and a rich cultural-educational tradition gradually adapted to
the force of settled newcomers. In part this can be attributed
to the general reductionism of "Real Socialist" society and the
relationship of the elite to tradition. As a result of eradication
of the urban spirit, the native population lost not only its mo-
tivation to remain in the town, but also the possibility to em-
ploy its educated members. Due to this, the town no longer
attracted young and educated people (we saw that immigrants
mostly came from the villages), while it repulsed its original
urban population. Under the guise of Communist ideology
and the plans of its political elite, old values (patriarchalism,
paternalism, ethnocentrism) continued to sizzle. They slowed
down and transformed the modernisation ambitions of the
state authorities and the system of values that these authori-
ties intended to establish.
Finally, one result of the last war is that during the nine-
ties the town has existed without a large part of its former in-
habitants, alternatively without one or without the other eth-
nic group. Intolerance, bitterness and many other negative
emotions filled the space between the two opposed ethnic gro-
ups. Reconciliation still has to be achieved. It would be good
if it would come out of an awareness, clearly shown in the hi-
story of Petrinja, that prosperity in an ethnically mixed area
can only stem from real equality between the ethnic groups,
i.e. from equality in rights and in actual accessibility to politi-
cal, economic, cultural and other resources.
NOTES
1 Petrinja is the main urban and economic centre of Banovina, a re-
gion in the South part of Central Croatia. Mediaeval (old) Petrinja
was first mentioned in 1240 in a charter in which the Slavonian
prince, duke Koloman (the brother of the Croatian and Hungarian
king Bela IV), conferred privileges on the town. The beginnings of
modern Petrinja, however, date from the victory over the Ottoman
Turks (1595). The Turks had erected a fortress on the site of the pre-
sent town (1592). After expulsion of the Ottomans, Petrinja became
part of the Military Frontier (a zone in Croatia along the border with
the Ottomans which had a special administrative status under
Habsburg centralistic rule). It gradually developed into a town cen-
tre. Between 1809 and 1813 the town was under French administra-
tion, as part of Napoleon's Illyrian provinces. Afterwards it was a-








united with Civil Croatia (cf. Kos, 1882; Golec, 1993). In the year 1752
Petrinja had 511 Catholic households and 5 households of other con-
fessions (Golec, 1993). From the second part of the 18th century more
andmore Eastern Orthodox immigrants moved into the town. How-
ever, the Eastern Orthodox population (called "Vlahs") had begun to
flee from the Turkish lands to Banovina in the early 16th century (the
name of the region is derived from Banska krajina, i.e. the Ban's bor-
derland, since this part of the Military Frontier had been under the
jurisdiction of the Ban of Croatia). The sojourn of the Habsburg ar-
my and the organisation of life in the multiethnic Habsburg Empire
left a trace in the ethnic structure of the town. Apart from the pre-
dominant Croats and Serbs, the population had also included groups
of Germans, Czechs, Slovaks and Italians. Likewise, the military past
left a mark on the town – various armies rotated through the Petrinja
barracks, influencing the life of the townspeople.
2 Renata Jambre{i}, in her analysis of the ethnonymic polarisation of
Banovina speaks of three types of ethnonyms (based on manuscript
collections from the 1950s and recordings from the 1990s): the legit-
imate type of ethnonym (Croats and Serbs), the alternative type
([okci, Bunjevci, Vlasi, Kranjci) that speak more of a feeling of dif-
ference, one's own/somebody else's feeling of the other or differen-
tial identity, rather than identifying clearly separate and homoge-
nous ethnic groups, and the third type of ethnonym, the substitute
type (Mu`i, @abari, Krd`ani, Orthodox, Catholic) in which emphasis
is placed on ethnic (self)identification which these names in many
cases express (Jambre{i}, 1993: 82).
3 The ethnically Croat population in Croatia suffered a loss of 3.5%
during the war, while the Serb population lost 17.1% of its members,
as calculated in relation to the expected population in 1948 (accord-
ing to @erjavi}, 1989: 39, 154).
4 Since the 1991 census was taken already at a time of intensifying
ethnic mobilisation and the beginning of conflicts there is some sus-
picion that the local authorities through their unconscientious cen-
sus takers manipulated the census questionnaire in regard to the
question on ethnic affiliation (according to Golec, 1993).
5 As much as 82% of the territory of the municipality of Petrinja was
occupied. From this area, according to statistics of the Croatian gov-
ernment's Office for displaced persons and refugees, a total of 11,041
persons were in exile in 1992 (9,817 Croats, 820 Serbs and 404 others).
In 1994 12,871 displaced persons were registered (Popis i preregis-
tracija..., 1994). It should be added that a part of the expellees, prima-
rily those that found refuge abroad, was never registered (this in-
cludes also a part of the Serbs, who at the beginning of the war left
for Serbia).
6 According to the results of fieldwork carried on in 1989 on the level
of Croatia as a whole, Serbs declared themselves as "Yugoslavs" rela-
tively much more often than did Croats (Lazi}, 1991).
7 The events during the Second World War certainly had their origins
in earlier happenings. However, since our goal is not to explain the
totality of relations between Croats and Serbs in the area in question,
but rather only changes in the ethnic composition during the post-







8 It should be noted, however, that the race laws in the "Independent
State of Croatia" (introduced after the model in Nazi Germany) tech-
nically did not apply to the Serb population, but to Jews and Gyp-
sies. Rather, the Serb population was affected by an ideology that de-
nied the right of non-Croats to have any say in the state and by legal
measures formally for state defence that permitted wide scale "re-
prisals" against it. "Who is a Serb has Serbia to go to, that is his home-
land" – stated one high Ustasha official. Some attempts were made to
turn the Serbs into Croats, but there was systematic discrimination
against the Serbs, and instances of participation in Chetnik (i.e. Serb
nationalist) or Partisan activity fueled the reprisals (see, for example,
Matkovi}, 1994: 154-164).
9 Immediately after the war Serbs accounted for almost a half of all
Communist party members in Croatia (Roksandi}, 1991).
10 Research on the social structure in the mid-1980s revealed that po-
litical functionaries were those who in the questionnaire showed the
highest degree of attachment to their regions, i.e. to the region in
which they were born. The feeling of local attachment is one of the
forms of expressing ethnic awareness and as "an indicator it mea-
sures ethnocentrism better than answers received on the basis of
questions regarding the nation or nationalism" (Katunari}, 1986: 82).
The results of this research can also be easily brought into relation
with earlier periods.
11 The meat processing enterprise "Gavrilovi}" was between 1945 and
1991 the largest employer in Petrinja. In 1986 the number of its em-
ployees was close to 5,000 (see 150 godina..., s.a.; 165 godina..., 1986).
It seems important to emphasize that a majority of Serbs dominated
(also) in the directorial elite of "Gavrilovi}", in a town that otherwise
had had a Croat majority for a long time. The situation was similar
in other enterprises as well (see Petrinjski obzor, 1991, no. 7).
12 In the period between the 1948 and 1961 census the number of Serbs
in the town of Petrinja tripled (an index of 295.1), and the number of
Croats increased slightly (an index of 126.9).
13 Included are themunicipalities of Dvor, Glina and Kostajnica. Accor-
ding to the 1961 data the proportions of Serbs and Croats in all of Ba-
novina (including Petrinja) was 62.4% (Serbs) and 36.1% (Croats). If
we exclude Petrinja itself, the ethnic composition in the undeveloped
municipalities in Banovina would be: 70.2% (Serbs) to 29.2% (Croats)
(cf. Klemen~i} and Ore{i}, 1991). It should again be noted that the lar-
gest number of immigrants arrived to Petrinja precisely from these
municipalities (and from neighbouring municipalities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, whichwas also part of regional projection envisioned in
the platform of long-term development of Banovina).
14 The Law onNationalisation of Buildings for Rent and Building Sites
from 1958 (and its later revisions) confiscated land from the domes-
tic population and thus created the conditions for its allocation to
new arrivals. Although studies on the level of Croatia as a whole
indicate an equal material status of Serbs and Croats it also clearly
shows that Serbs, more often than Croats, received housing from
their work collectives/enterprises (Stojkovi}, 1991).
15 The term ruling elite can be used here only conditionally, since it
would imply the existence of a group of people (the authorities). How-








life of Petrinja was subject to the self-will of one local politician (of
Serb origin) who was connected with the party centre in Belgrade (for
more details see, for example, Petrinjski obzor, vol. 1990 and 1991).
16 We might mention that the proportion of Croats employed in the
meat processing enterprise "Gavrilovi}", which in 1970 (56%) still con-
formed to their proportion in the town population (in 1971 55.8%),
later fell to 38%. Between 1978 and 1989, 20 functionary positions
were held by persons of Serb ethnic affiliation and only seven by Cro-
ats. In 1987, for example, 74% of all allocated land plots were given to
persons of Serb ethnicity, and this was similar in the following two
years (Petrinjski obzor, 1991, nos 7 and 8).
17 The "Croatian Spring" is a term for the political, cultural and eco-
nomic movement that was violently suppressed in 1971. The move-
ment had three main goals: economic reform in the direction of mar-
ket economy, democratisation of the political system and reform of
the Federation. The echoes of the "Croatian Spring" in Petrinjaweremost
apparent in the greater activity of Matica hrvatska (Matrix Croatica).
Reputable citizens of Petrinja who had been involved withMatica hr-
vatska, or who had even been suspected of being its members, were
expulsed, fired from their jobs or given "party" punishments. This was
a time of much politically motivated migration from the town (Go-
lec, 1993).
18 The change in the number of people who declared themselves as
"Yugoslavs" indicates the degree to which such an identification was
dependent on political conditions and the influence of ideology.
Between the 1971 and 1981 census in all of Croatia the number of "Yu-
goslavs" increased (the 1981/1971 index being 450.6). In Petrinja it in-
creased nine-fold. In 1981 "Yugoslavs" became the third "ethnic group"
in the town (24.7% of the population), but in the next census, at the
time of ethnic homogenisation, this number was to be three fold less.
At this time the proportion of "Yugoslavs" in Petrinja fell to 7.1%.
19 Serbsmore often than Croatsmade use of the party-functional chan-
nel for their vertical social mobility, whereas Croats more often used
the educational channel. In one study this was explained by differ-
ent starting positions: Croats were more educated, while Serbs were
more firmly tied to the Communist party and the partisan movement.
Since Serbs had in the meantime overcome their back-lag in educa-
tion it was assumed that the inter-ethnic difference in patterns of mo-
bilisation would be erased (Lazi}, 1991).
20 Even in the late 1980s respondents in sociological surveys (on the
level of Croatia) did not wish to express ethnocentric standpoints.
According to Vjeran Katunari} this indicated a high degree of adapt-
ability in attitudes in regard to external pressures. Expression of ethno-
centrism was relatively weak, because it had been for a long time
forbidden (Katunari}, 1986; 1991).
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Dru{tvene promjene, migracije i
etni~ka struktura: primjer Petrinje (Hrvatska)
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U ovom se radu razmatra promjena narodnosnog sastava
grada Petrinje i njezini uzroci koji se ~ine paradigmati~nima
za narodnosno mije{ana podru~ja Hrvatske. Petrinja je
izabrana zbog bipolarne etni~ke strukture u kojoj Hrvati i
Srbi ~ine ve}inu stanovni{tva, ali i ~injenice da je u razdoblju
od 1945. do 1998. godine do{lo do korjenitih promjena
udjela tih etni~kih skupina. Jo{ 1948. Hrvati su ~inili ne{to
vi{e od 4/5 stanovni{tva grada. Godine 1991. Hrvata je bilo
40,96 posto, Srba 45,14 posto te "ostalih i nepoznatih" 13,9
posto. Tako u gradu Petrinji za ~etiri desetlje}a Hrvati
izgubi{e status izrazito ve}inskoga naroda s jasnom
tendencijom smanjenja udjela. Uzroci tih procesa tra`e se u
novim mobilnosnim kanalima (negativna selekcija kadrova,
"nomenklatura" itd.) karakteristi~nim za poslijeratnu
komunisti~ku vlast. Mo} se uspostavljala na karizmi lokalnih
partizana i ~lanova Komunisti~ke partije u okviru politi~koga
sustava s kojim su se (~ini se) vi{e identificirali lokalni Srbi
nego Hrvati. Veza ideologije i subetni~kih tradicija







mre`e, te`nje nerazvijene {ire okolice (s ve}inskim srpskim
stanovni{tvom) prema razvijenijoj Petrinji plodili su
selektivno{}u migracije i, posljedi~no, promjenom etni~ke
strukture. Dramati~ne promjene etni~ke strukture nastale su
1991., s agresijom na Hrvatsku. Migracijski tokovi nisu se jo{
stabilizirali. Tek }e sljede}i popis stanovni{tva (2001. godine)
razvidno pokazati kakve su posljedice na etni~ku strukturu
Petrinje ostavili rat i poratna zbivanja.
Gesellschaftliche Veränderungen,
Migrationen und ethnische Struktur: das
Beispiel Petrinja (Kroatien)
Jadranka ^A^I]-KUMPES
Institut für Migrationen und Völkerschaften, Zagreb
Ivo NEJA[MI]
Lehrerakademie, Universität Zagreb
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Veränderungen in der ethnischen
Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung von Petrinja sowie die
Ursachen, die dazu geführt haben und die in Bezug auf die
ethnisch gemischten Landesteile Kroatiens paradigmatisch
erscheinen. Die Wahl der Verfasser fiel auf Petrinja, weil
diese Kleinstadt (etwa 40 km südöstlich von Zagreb) eine
bipolare ethnische Zusammensetzung aufweist: Kroaten und
Serben machen den Großteil der Bevölkerung aus. Außer-
dem ist es zwischen 1945 und 1998 zu tief greifenden
Veränderungen im jeweiligen Anteil dieser ethnischen
Bevölkerungsgruppen gekommen. Noch 1948 stellten die
Kroaten etwas mehr als 4/5 der Stadtbevölkerung. 1991 lag
der Anteil der Kroaten bei 40,96%, der Anteil der Serben lag
bei 45,14%; "übrige und unbekannte" Bevölkerungsanteile
stellten 13,9%. In vier Jahrzehnten haben die Kroaten in der
Stadt Petrinja den Status des mehrheitlichen Bevölkerungs-
anteils eingebüßt und eine klare Rückgangstendenz verbucht.
Die Ursachen sind in gesellschaftlichen Umkanalisierungs-
prozessen zu suchen (negative Kaderauswahl, "Nomenklatur"
usw.), wie sie für die kommunistische Herrscherelite nach
dem II. Weltkrieg charakteristisch waren. Die Machtträger
wurden in den Reihen charismatischer lokaler Partisanen
gesucht sowie unter den Mitgliedern der Kommunistischen
Partei und fügten sich in den Rahmen eines politischen
Systems, mit dem sich (wie es scheint) die lokalen Serben
eher identifizierten als die Kroaten. Die Verbindung von
Ideologie und subethnischen Traditionen (Patriarchat,
Paternalismus, Ethnozentrismus), Sippenverbände und
Landflucht (Abwanderung der Landbevölkerung mit
überwiegend serbischem Anteil in das entwickelte Petrinja)
zeitigten selektive Migrationsprozesse und in der Folge eine








weiteren, dramatischen Veränderungen der ethnischen
Struktur kam es mit Ausbruch des serbischen
Aggressionskriegs 1991. Die Migrationsvorgänge haben sich
bislang noch nicht stabilisiert. Erst die nächste Volkszählung
im Jahr 2001 wird ein klares Bild von den Folgen zeichnen,
die der Krieg und das Nachkriegsgeschehen in der
ethnischen Bevölkerungsstruktur Petrinjas hinterlassen haben.
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